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ON A GENERALIZATION OF SHANNON'S RANDOM 
CIPHER RESULT 
PRASANNA K. SAHOO 
In this paper, Shannon's random cipher result was generalized using the entropy of degree a. 
This generalization leads to new definitions, like redundancy of degree a and key rate of degree a. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Shannon's random cipher result [13] states that a good secrecy system can be 
built if the key rate of the crypto system is greater than the message redundancy. 
This random cipher result was obtained by Shannon considering the equivocation 
of the key over a random cipher. Hellman [6] proved the same result by counting 
the average number of spurious decipherments over a restricted class of random 
ciphers. Lu [11] obtained a general result by considering average probability of 
correct decryptment for the cryptanalyst. 
Havrda and Charvat [5], and Daroczy [2] have proposed a generalization of 
Shannon entropy. This generalized entropy is called the entropy of degree a. For 
various characterizations and other properties regarding this entropy see [1, 2, 7, 8, 
10]. A coding theorem for entropy of degree a can be obtained from a general 
theorem proved in [9]. A generalized Fano bound was given by El-Sayed [4] by 
considering entropy of degree a. In this paper, Shannon's random cipher result 
will be generalized using entropy of degree a. A similar generalization of random 
cipher result was given by the author [12] considering the Renyi's entropy of order a. 
The present generalization leads to new definitions, like redundancy of degree a 
and key rate of degree a. 
2. MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
A message is a stationary random sequence from a finite set called the set of 
alphabets. A key is a bijective mapping which is used for enciphering the message. 
A cryptogram is a message which is being enciphered by the use of a key. To encipher 
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means to transfer the message by using a key into a cryptogram. To decipher means 
to solve the cryptogram with the aid of the key used in the oiiginal enciphering, 
whereas to decrypt means to solve the cryptogram without knowing the particular 
key used. An encipherer writes the message into a cryptogram by using some ran­
domly selected key. A decipherer decodes the cryptogram using the particular key 
that has been used in generating the cryptogram. An instantaneous block encipherer 
is an encipherer which instantaneously groups the incoming message sequence 
into words of fixed block length. An instantaneous block decipherer groups the 
cryptograms sequence into cryptogram words and deciphers them into the original 
messages. The set of messages, together with their probability, is called the message 
space. A cipher is a pair consisting of the set of keys and their probability distribution. 
Consider the simple block diagram in Figure 1 that represents a crypto system. 
The output {M,} of the message source is a stationary random sequence. Each 
component Mi takes the value from a finite set AM. The instantaneous block enciphe­
rer groups the incoming message sequence {M,} into message words of length n. 
Let us denote a message word of length n by M = (Mu M2,..., M„). 
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of a Crypto system. 
For a fixed key K, the key word generator outputs a key word of length n. Let 
CK = (CK>1, CKi2, •••, CKi„) denote the key word of length n, where each CKi e Ac, 
a finite set of key alphabets. 
For each digit i, the instantaneous block encipherer produces the ith digit of the 
cryptogram word X using the following relation 
(1) Xt=f(Mi,CK<l), i=l,2,...,n, 
where j is a bijective function from AM x Ac into AK; the set of the cryptogram 
letters. The instantaneous decipherer uses the key to generate the key word and applies 
the inverse off to each letter X, of the cryptogram word X to recover the message 
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word M. That is 
(2) M, = / - 1 ( / ( M , . , Q , , . ) , C A i i ) . 
The cryptanalyst intercepts the cryptogram words and attempts to decrypt the 
words by using his/her knowledge of the a priori message and key probabilities, 
the combiner / , the block length n, the key rate r, and the cipher. That is for the 
actual key K the cryptanalyst estimates a key K* and decrypts the message as M* = 
= (M*,M*,...,M*) where 
(3) M* - 9{Xlt CK.lt), i= 1 ,2 , . . . ,« . 
The decrypted message word M* is only one of the possible message words, given 
the cryptogram word X and the cipher. 
3. DEFINITIONS 
Let r„ = {P = (pu p2, ..., p„) | pk = 0, X Pk — 1} denote the set of all n-compo-
fc=i 
nents complete probability distributions. Havrda and Charvat [5] have defined 
entropy of degree a as 
(4) H*„(P) = iL-\ipl-l), « * 1 
k=l 
where /x = (21-* — 1), a 4= 1 and P e F„. This entropy of degree a is a generalization 
of Shannon's entropy in the sense that 
(5) lim W„(P) = Hln{P), 
where 
(6) HlJP) = -£Pk log pk . 
/c = l 
Throughout this paper 0 log 0 and 0" are assumed to be zero and logarithm is taken 
with respect to base 2. 
Let X and Y be two ensembles, and X x Y be the cartesian product of X and Y 
called the joint ensemble of X and Y. Let xu x2,..., x„ be the events in X with 
probabilities p'^x^, p{x2),..., p(x„), respectively. Similarly, let yu y2,..., ym be 
the events in Y with probabilities p(y^, p(y2), ••-,p(j
;m)- The outcomes of X x Y 
are (xu yt), (xu y2),..., (x„, y,„) with probabilities p(xu y^, p(xu y2), ..., p(x„, ym), 
respectively. Using Bayes rule, one can write 
(7) K^) = %^> K )̂>o-
p{yj) 
The joint entropy of degree a is defined as 
(s) , Hi(z,Y) = / i -
i ( i lA^yj)-1) 
i-i j=i 
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and the equivocation of degree a is defined as (see [2] and [4]) 
(9) HJX | Y) - „--( i £ f(Xh yj) - t f(yj)) . 
i = i i = i y = i 
From (9) it is easy to see that 
(10) HjX, Y) = Hm(Y) + H'JX | Y). 
If X and Y are stochastically independent, then from (7) and (8), the following is 
obtained 
(11) HJX, Y) = Hxn(X) + Hm(Y) + nH*„(X) Hm(Y) . 
The suffix from Han will be dropped henceforth and will be used only in the case 
of possible confusion. 
Let me A^ be a message word of length n, and m* be the decrypted word for the 
message word m. Let the probability of an error in correct decryptment of the f'th 
digit be 
(12) Pli, n) -. I Y. K'*> «*) • 
IIISAM" m'eAM" 
m**m 
The expected number of errors on decryptment of a message words is 
(13) pJLn) = tpJ(t,n). 
; = i » 
and the average probability of error per letter for a message words of length n is 
defined as 
(14) pjn) = - Pe(n) . 
n 
It is assumed that the sets AM, Ac, and AK are of finite cardinality and the combiner 
/ is one-to-one in each variable. Based on this assumption, it follows that 
(15) pe(i, n) = pr{CKti + C*.,,} . 
The redundancy of degree a. in message words corresponding to a given crypto 
system is defined as 
(16) ^) = ^ ^ - ^ W - « ) -
nyt n 
By l'Hopital rule, it can be proven that 
(17) limd„(a) = l o g | A M | - ^ M . 
a-»l n 
The right hand side of (17) is the redundancy d of the message words as defined 
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by Lu [11]. Similarly, the key rate of degree a is defined as 
\A I1-" - 1 
(18) r„(a) = l-*l 1. 
nn 
and in the limiting case it is equal to the key rate r (see [11]), that is 
(19) lim r„(a) = ^ ^ 1 . 
4. THE MAIN RESULT 
The following two results on the entropy of degree a are due to El-Sayed [4]. 
Result 1 (cf. [4]). Let a > 1 and (X, Y) be a joint ensemble, such that each of 
the sample spaces X and Y contains the same N elements, and let pe(n) be the 
probability of error. Then the equivocation of degree a satisfies the inequality 
(20) H\X | Y) <: H%pe(n)) + p*jn) 
l-(N- 1) 
1 - 2 1 
l - « 
Result 2 (cf. [4]). Let a > 1 and (Xn, Y") be a joint ensemble of sequences 
(xu x2,..., x„) and (yu y2, ..., >>„) of length n, such that each of the sample spaces 
Xt and Y; (i = 1, 2 , . . . , n) of xt and y; respectively contain the same N elements. 
U Pe(n) is the average probability of error, then the (n-ary) equivocation of degree 
a satisfies the following inequality 
(21) i H\X» | Y-) ^ H*2(pjn)) + pe(n) * ~ ^ ~ V". 
Now, to prove the main theorem, consider a stationary discrete message source 
with redundancy of degree a and alphabet size \AM\, and a cipher with the key rate 
of degree a. Let M denote the random variable representing the message and K 
denote the random variable representing the key. Since M and K are stochastically 
independent, 
(22) H\M, K) = H\M) + H\K) + fiH\M) H\K). 
Using / as one-to-one in each variable and 
(23) X=f(M,CK), 
the following is obtained 
(24) H\M, K) = H\X, K), 
where X is the cryptogram. However, by (10) 
(25) H\X, K) = H\X) + H\K | X) 
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is obtained. From (22), (24) and (25), one can get 
(26) H\K | X) = H\M) + H\K) + nH\M) H\K) - H\X). 
Since the total number of cryptograms is equal to \AM\", H\X) can be bounded by 
(27) H\X) = ti-\\AM\«-^-\). 
The use of (27) in (26) yields 
(28) H\K I X) = H\K) - [J--L____l _ _ M (i + fiH\K))\ n . 
I nii n J 
Since the keys are chosen randomly, each key is equiprobable, hence 
(29) H\K) = M*l*~" ~ 1 . 
Replacing H\K) in (28) by (29) and using the definitions (16) and (18), it follows that 
(30) H\K | X) ^ n(r„(a) - dn(a)) . 
Notice that K* is a function of only X (i.e. the cryptanalyst gets the estimate K* 
from the intercepted cryptogram X), therefore, 
(31) H\K\K*) = H\K\X). 
Hence (30) with (31) yield 
(32) H\K | K*) = n(rja) - d„(a)). 
Since there is a key words CK, associated with each key K, and since key words are 
distinct 
(33) H\CK | CK.) = H\K | K*), 
where CK = (CKA, CK2,..., CKn) and CK, = (CK,A, CK,a, •••, CK,<n). Using a result 
from El-Sayed [3] 
(34) H\CK | CK,) = H\CKA | Q . ) + H\CKa \ CKA, CK.) + ... 
... + H\CK,1\CKil,...,CKin.1,CK,). 
It has been shown (see [3]) that for a > 1, 
(35) H\X | Y Z) = H\X | Y), 
where X, Y and Z are any three random variables. Using the inequality (35) in (34), 
(36) £H\CKti\CK,J = H\CK\CK,). 
i=l 
and from (33), (36) and (32), 
(37) - t H%CK,I I Qv) _ '•„(«) - dn(«) , 
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is obtained. Applying Result 1, one can get 
(38) pl(i, n) 1 " {lA"\~S~* + HtPe(U «)) _ H\CK,t | Q. , ) . 
By mimicking the proof of Result 2 (see [4]) and using (37) and (38) the following 
(39) Hl{pe(n)) + Pjn) I - = I I M z i ^ _ r„(a) - d,,(a) 
is obtained. Thus the following theorem is proved. 
Theorem. Consider a stationary random discrete source with alphabet size \AM\. 
For a > I, let d„(a) be the redundancy of degree a, r„(a) be the key rate of degree a., 
and pe(n) be the average probability of error of correct decryptment, then 
mpe(n)) + Pjn) i^d^jr: ^ ,.i(a) _ dn{a). 
Remark. For a limiting case (i.e. when a -» 1""), the inequality (39) tends to the 
following inequality 
Hl2(pe(n)) + - » l o g ( | A M | - 1) £ r - d . 
This inequality was proven by Lu [11]. 
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